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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 10-3093 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
LEO SMITH, III, 
                          Appellant 
____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. No. 03-CR-00045-002) 
District Judge:  Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 14, 2011 
____________ 
 
Before: RENDELL, BARRY and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: March 22, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Leo Smith, III, appeals the District Court’s order denying him relief under 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), thus reaffirming a previously imposed sentence of 240 months 
imprisonment for his role in a drug distribution conspiracy.   For the reasons set forth 
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below, we will affirm. 
I. 
Federal agents arrested Smith on May 9, 2003, pursuant to a criminal complaint 
charging him with distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base 
(crack), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  On May 13, 2003, a nine-count second 
superseding indictment was filed, alleging in count one that Smith conspired to distribute 
and possess with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of crack, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 846, and alleging in count nine that Smith possessed firearms in relation to drug 
trafficking felonies, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).  
Smith entered into a plea agreement with the government, and on January 28, 
2004, he pled guilty to count one.  Pursuant to the agreement, count one was amended to 
reflect no specific quantity of crack.  The government also agreed to dismiss count nine.  
Accordingly, Smith faced a maximum statutory sentence of 240 months and no 
mandatory minimum.  On October 22, 2004, the District Court sentenced Smith to the 
statutory maximum, which was less than the imprisonment range of 262 to 327 months 
recommended by the Guidelines.  On appeal, we remanded for resentencing in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).   
On June 29, 2006, the District Court resentenced Smith to the statutory maximum.  
In declining to grant a variance under Booker, the Court noted that it would have imposed 
the same sentence had the crime involved powder cocaine, and that in sentencing Smith to 
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the maximum term it was taking into account his leadership role in the conspiracy as well 
as the involvement of firearms and the “extreme danger” associated with the use of 
firearms.  App. at 127; see also id. at 125-32.  We affirmed.  See Smith v. United States, 
250 F. App’x 522 (3d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1027 (2008).        
On May 11, 2010, Smith moved, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), for a 
reduction in his sentence in light of Amendment 706 to the Guidelines, which 
retroactively “lowered the base offense level for offenses involving most quantities of 
crack cocaine by two levels.”  United States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 
2010).  For purposes of the Guidelines range, the U.S. Probation Office recalculated 
Smith’s Total Offense Level as 35, which, as it had before, included a two-level 
enhancement for the possession of a firearm, pursuant to § 2D1.1(b)(1).  Smith’s adjusted 
Guidelines range was 210 to 240 months.
1
  In denying Smith’s motion for relief under 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), the District Court again noted Smith’s leadership role and the 
extreme danger involved with firearms, App. at 5-6, and concluded that it “remains 
convinced that a sentence of 240 months is appropriate in this case.”  Id. at 6.   
Smith appeals.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a 
district court’s decision “whether to grant or deny a defendant’s motion to reduce 
sentence under § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion.”  United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 
152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009).  However, “[w]e exercise plenary review over legal questions 
                                                 
1
  If not for the statutory maximum of 240 months, the recommended imprisonment 
range would have been 210 to 262 months.   
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concerning the proper interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines.”  United States v. 
Thompson, 70 F.3d 279, 280-81 (3d Cir. 1995) (per curiam).   
II. 
Smith argues that by considering his possession of a firearm as a basis to deny his 
request for a sentence reduction, the District Court effectively punished him twice 
because his Guidelines range already included an enhancement for firearms possession in 
connection with a drug offense.  Citing to § 2K2.4 cmt. n.4
2
 of the Guidelines, as well as 
to cases from outside this circuit, Smith contends that “[i]n general, the Guidelines seek to 
avoid double counting where, as here, a particular enhancement is already included in the 
prosecution or sentencing calculus.”  Appellant’s Br. at 12-13.  While he acknowledges 
that his “circumstance does not squarely implicate this rule,” he argues that “the multiple 
use of a factor that has already been incorporated into the Guidelines is substantially 
similar.”  Id. at 13. 
 We previously have rejected this argument, and will do so again.  In United States 
v. Greenidge, the defendant claimed that the district court erred at sentencing by giving 
undue consideration to actions by which he obstructed justice, when the Guidelines range 
already included an obstruction of justice enhancement.  495 F.3d 85, 102 (3d Cir. 2007), 
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1017 (2007).  Rejecting this claim, “[w]e emphasize[d] that a  
                                                 
2
    Section 2K2.4 cmt. n.4 generally discusses when a court may apply a sentencing 
enhancement for weapon possession or use, but Smith does not specify which part of this 
multiple-paragraph section supports his theory of improper double counting. 
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sentencing court is not prohibited from considering the factual basis underlying a 
defendant’s sentence enhancements, and indeed, should consider those facts in order to 
tailor the sentence to the defendant’s individual circumstances.”  Id. at 103. 
Smith’s case is on all fours with Greenidge, and the District Court did not err in 
considering Smith’s possession of a firearm when it declined to reduce his sentence.  It is 
well settled that, after Booker, a district court must follow a three-step sentencing process.  
First, the court must calculate the Guidelines sentence “precisely as [it] would have 
before Booker.”  United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).  Second, the 
court must “formally rul[e] on the motions of both parties and stat[e] on the record 
whether [it is] granting a departure and how that departure affects the Guidelines 
calculation, and tak[e] into account this Circuit’s pre-Booker caselaw, which continues to 
have advisory force.”  United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 2006).  Finally, 
the court must exercise its discretion by considering the relevant factors in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a) in setting the sentence imposed, “regardless whether it varies from the sentence 
calculated under the Guidelines.”  Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247. 
By considering Smith’s possession of a firearm in connection with the § 3553(a) 
factors, the District Court followed clear post-Booker sentencing procedures and the 
guidance of the Sentencing Commission.  See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 
1B1.10 cmt. n.1(B)(i), (ii) (noting that, when considering a § 3582(c)(2) motion, the court 
“shall consider” the § 3553(a) factors and “shall consider” public safety considerations).  
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The Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Smith’s motion for a sentence reduction.   
III. 
 We will affirm the order of the District Court.   
 
